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Abstract 
People differ in their willingness to take risks. Recent work found that a dominant class of 
measures, revealed preference tasks (e.g., laboratory lotteries), appear not to tap into stable 
individual differences, whereas survey-based stated preferences are stable and predict 
real-world risk taking across different domains. How can stated preferences, often criticised as 
inconsequential (“cheap talk”), be more valid and predictive than controlled, incentivized 
lotteries? In our multi-method study, over 3,000 respondents from population samples answered 
a single widely used and predictive risk preference question. Respondents then explained the 
reasoning behind their answer. They tended to recount diagnostic behaviours and experiences, 
focusing on voluntary, consequential acts and experiences from which they seemed to infer 
their risk preference. We found that third-party readers of respondents’ brief memories and 
explanations reached similar inferences about respondents' preferences, indicating the 
intersubjective validity of this information. Our results also shed light on the process of 
preference formation through experience over the lifespan. Finally, stated risk preferences may 
capture preferences revealed in behaviours in the wild better than the contrived behavioural 
tasks preferred in economics because they permit people to draw upon their own understanding 
of what constitutes diagnostic behaviours and experiences. 
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Consequential decisions about health, finances, and relationships often invoke the question of 
how much risk one is willing to take. Unsurprisingly then, risk preferences are widely studied in 
experimental economics; personality, cognitive, and clinical psychology; and even animal 
personality research.​1–4​ Measures of risk preference can help predict a wide range of 
behaviours, from smoking and pathological gambling​5​ to self-employment and holding stocks.​6–9 
 
Two very different measurement traditions have investigated risk preferences in humans. The 
revealed preference ​approach, common in economics, has sought to study choices under risk in 
the field​10​ and in the laboratory.​11​ The paradigmatic research designs in this tradition are 
observational studies of real behaviours (e.g., consumption and saving) and choices between 
monetary lotteries. At the same time, personality and clinical psychologists, as well as some 
economists, have used a ​stated preference ​approach. Here, people are asked to state their 
willingness to take risks, either using general questions or hypothetical scenarios. Our goal is to 
explain why and how stated preferences are informative by embedding them in the literature on 
self-perception and self-insight. In doing so we not only provide insight into the measurement of 
preferences, but also highlight the role that experiences play in preference formation over the 
lifespan.  
 
Economists have been particularly skeptical about the validity of stated preferences, where 
(un)truthful answers have no material consequences (e.g. ​12​); therefore, to verify the 
assumptions made to infer preferences from observations of real life behaviour, such as stability 
over time and the ability to control factors other than preferences, they have typically turned to 
revealed preference measures, which offered greater control over confounding factors while still 
measuring “real” behaviour (see ​13–15​). Ironically, when researchers compared revealed and 
stated risk preference measures systematically,​5,16–18​ they found that the behavioural measures 
used in the revealed​ ​preference approach consistently underperform relative to the stated 
preference measures in terms of reliability, stability, construct, and predictive validity.​4,13 
Specifically, the former did not correlate across measures, meaning that they did not capture a 
latent preference that drives behaviour across different choice situations—even when 
differences between tasks were abstracted away by modelling the decision process.​19​ In 
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 contrast, the stated risk preferences correlated across items and questionnaires and suggested 
the existence of a general risk factor. Finally, convergence between revealed and stated 
preferences has been found to be low, particularly when confounders like age and gender are 
kept constant.​5,9,20,21 
 
Copious research has investigated the cognitive processes that underlie behaviour (e.g., 
choice) in the lab-based revealed preferences approach.​19,22​ By contrast, little is known about 
the processes that shape responses in the stated preference approach (but see ​23,24​). This gap 
may be a factor behind many economists not adopting the stated preference approach. 
Although self-reports are widely used in psychology, their accuracy is often contended, with 
some researchers emphasizing their context sensitivity and potential for bias and 
self-enhancement​25,26​ and others arguing that self-reports are often valid under real-world 
conditions.​27–30  
 
While few believe that people can draw on absolute, internal values to objectively report their 
preferences or personality, there is a reason to believe people have a keen sense of their own 
relative standing on these dimensions. Bem​31​ argued that people’s self-perception co-opts the 
abilities used for social perception. That is, the same ability of instant recognition that allows a 
person to call someone a crazy bastard when they sprint across a busy street​32​ can also be 
applied by a person to themself. Bem and other social psychologists focused on explaining how 
this co-opted adaptation causes lapses in self-judgment,​33​ whereas recent work draws on the 
concept of self–other knowledge asymmetries to explain why people know themselves better 
than others do in some but not all areas.​29,30​ Such asymmetries may also explain some of the 
discrepancy in validity between stated and revealed preference measures: People's preference 
to take risks can be “revealed” in their choices and actions, but the very same choice could 
be—depending on their psychological state, their current needs, and their overall abilities​34,35​—a 
risk taken willingly, an impulse regretted immediately, a last resort when cornered, or child's play 
for the highly skilled. Unlike the decision maker, external observers cannot easily access these 
internal states to infer the preferences from the observed behaviour. 
 
To unpack the process of self-perception we asked how people translate their memories and 
intuitions into an answer to the question “How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person 
who is fully prepared to take risks or do you try to avoid taking risks?” on a scale from 0 to 10 
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 (“unwilling to take risks” to “fully prepared to take risks”). This single question, the General Risk 
Question (GRQ;​6​ has been used in several large and widely analyzed surveys.​36–38​ The GRQ is 
predictive of real-world risk taking​6​ and is one of the best indicators of the general factor of risk 
preferences.​5​ Many genetic loci linked to risk preferences in a genome-wide association study 
were identified through the use of similar single-item questions.​39 
 
Here, we took a descriptive approach that lets participants speak because systematically 
varying questions, examples, and reference frames​40–42​ would already require deviations from 
the widely used GRQ. Instead, we asked people to explain how they answered the GRQ and 
which risks they thought about in order to illuminate how people infer their own risk preferences 
from their decisions, indecisions, and regrets. We were interested in three aspects of how 
people evaluate their risk preferences: 
 
1. What kind of risks do people consider when they judge themselves? Are these concrete 
everyday risks with clear consequences, or small, cumulative risks with stochastic 
consequences? Which reference frames do people use? And do they mainly think about 
risks they took and considered worthwhile, or do risks they avoided or regretted taking 
feature too? 
2. Do age and gender affect the risks people invoke and experience? 
3. Can independent third parties agree on what people's experiences say about their 
preferences? 
 
We collected stated risk preferences as part of two large, age-heterogeneous survey studies in 
Germany: the 2017 interim survey of the BASE-II study​43​ and the 2017/2018 Innovation Sample 
of the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).​44​ Across both studies, 3,493 respondents 
answered the GRQ. After doing so, they were asked to explain their response in closed-form 
questions about the social and temporal reference frames they had had in mind, as well in 
free-text questions about the topics and events they had thought about. They then listed the 
biggest risks they took in the past year. BASE-II respondents were also asked if the risks they 




Figure 1: ​Flow chart of the data collection, coding, and rating steps. Boxes are samples, ellipses reflect 
steps in the data collecting and processing.  
 
To quantify the topics featured in respondents’ free-text answers, we conducted two further 
studies (Figure 1). We first designed a coding scheme with a list of risk factors. Participants of 
an online panel (n = 825) rated three to five specific risk factors or behaviours from this coding 
scheme, ranging from divorce to cycling, on 20 dimensions (e.g., voluntariness and immediacy) 
known in the literature​45,46​ and on two dimensions to differentiate social from mortality risks. 
From 16 of these dimensions, we extracted the well-known factors ​Dread​ and ​Unknown​45​ in a 
confirmatory factor analysis (see Supplement 7.2). Dreaded risks tend to be global, 
uncontrollable, involuntary, and hard to reduce. Unknown risks tend to be hard to notice and 
observe, and to have delayed effects. Both factors featured prominently in the psychometric 
study of risk perception spearheaded by Slovic.​45  
 
We then asked coders to read the free-text responses to see whether they would agree with 
each other and with the authors of the text on whether the risks taken, not taken, or even 
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 regretted were cues of high or low willingness to take risks—that is, whether there was 
intersubjective agreement on how risk preferences are revealed in experiences and choices. 
Nine coders read the free-text answers and coded each in triplicate. Coders noted the presence 
of risk domains, such as investments or health, and more specific risk factors, such as skydiving 
or divorce. Last, we asked each coder to estimate—based solely on the text responses—the 
stated risk preference (GRQ) of the respondent. 
Results 
What risks do people invoke? 
Across both studies, 2,510 respondents (72%) gave free-text responses that were sufficiently 
elaborate to code risk topics (see Supplement 4 for an analysis of nonresponse). The coded 
topic frequencies for the two free-text questions were highly correlated (r = 0.94), so we report 
summed frequencies in the following (see also Supplementary Tables 7 and 8). Table 1 shows 




 Table 1. Frequencies with which risk domains and subtopics were mentioned.  
Domain Mentions Q1 Subtopics 
investments 771 418 investment (242), bought home (86), founded company 
(15), sold home (13) 
relationships 760 399 moving (132), conflicts (79), children general (59), 
speaking out (44), separation (36), pregnant (26), 
marriage (24), moving in (14), divorce (13), colleagues 
(10), affairs (7), sticking by (7) 
traffic 645 332 car (278), bicycle (172), motorcycle (44), airplane (33), 
bus (18), train (1) 
career 612 321  
safety 437 239 disregarding own frailty (85), working around house and 
garden (75), going out alone (36), risking being mugged 
(34), showing moral courage (31), exposure to terrorism 
(3), fireworks (0), weapons (0) 
travel 433 212  
sports 414 233 mountaineering (100), water sports (36), skiing (33), 
skydiving (23), swimming (19), bungee jumping (8), 
jogging (7), motor sports (1), shooting sports (0) 
health 371 136 surgery (116), drinking (15), immediate health risks: other 
(14), long-term health risks: other (9), drugs: other (8), 
sex (7), smoking (7), unhealthy food (7), medication side 
effects (2), vaccines (1), cannabis (0), GMO food (0), 
toxins: other (0), pesticides (0), air pollution (0), coffee 
(0), vaccine avoidance (0) 
other 229 144  
gambling 119 59  
crime 37 15 commit misdemeanors (18), commit crime (4) 
cataclysm 14 10 terror attack (3), earthquake (1), flooding (0), nuclear 
waste/war/accidents/fallout (0) 
Note.​ All numbers reflect the number of times a topic was coded from the texts written by our 
respondents in response to both of the free-text questions. The column Q1 shows the number of 
mentions in response to the first free-text question (on which risks people thought about).  
 
The topics respondents mentioned frequently tended to be low on the dimensions Unknown and 
Dread (Figure 2; in addition to the coded categories, we present unigram and bigram word 




Figure 2.​ Risk topics are placed in a coordinate system of the Dread (left to right) and Unknown (bottom 
to top) factors extracted from the risk perception ratings of our online sample. The size and transparency 
of the dots reflects how often these topics were coded from the responses to the two free-text questions. 
 
When thinking about their risk preferences, respondents focused on common, known risks. We 
can further characterize the frequently mentioned risks in terms of the rated subdimensions (see 
supplementary Figure 18): People tended to reference risks that they took ​voluntarily​ (sports, 
not terror attacks), that had ​observable​ consequences (getting on a ladder, not side effects from 
medication), and which they could ​control and prevent​ (cars and bikes, not planes and buses).  
 
In line with that pattern, respondents focused on health risks such as surgery and other 
interventions with immediate consequences, not on chronic risks that have cumulative and 
delayed effects such as drinking and smoking. The exceptions to these trends were often 
non-mortality risks: Investment, career, and relationship risks do not always have immediate, 
knowable consequences. In fact, career and education decisions were the only frequent risk 
that ranked high on the Unknown dimension. Nobody mentioned the three most unknown topics 
(according to our online raters): GMO food, pesticides, and “toxins: other.” Respondents almost 
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 never mentioned topics that were dreadful​,​ such as nuclear war or similar cataclysmic events. 
The most common dreadful topic—terror attacks—was mentioned by only nine respondents. 
Which reference frames do people use?  
Respondents reported diverse social and temporal reference frames in our two closed-form 
questions. In both studies, most respondents said they thought of their own experiences and 
behaviour, or the consequences of their actions, whereas a substantial minority also mentioned 
comparison with others or what others say (Figure 3). We varied the available response options 
across the two samples (see Supplement 4). The BASE-II respondents answered an additional 
question about temporal reference frames; almost all said they thought about the present (78%, 
n=1,209) or the past (70%, n=1,081), and most of these respondents (52%, n=807) thought 
about past and present (Figure 4). A substantial fraction of respondents (39%, n=607) also 
referred to the future, but rarely without thinking about either the past or the present as well (1%, 
n=20). Some (10%, n=161) respondents additionally endorsed an aspirational reference 
frame—they thought about how they would like to be—or said they did not think about 




Figure 3. ​Social reference frames. Compared to SOEP-IS respondents, BASE-II respondents endorsed 
more options and did not have the option to say they responded spontaneously, or based on something 




Figure 4. ​Temporal reference frames. This UpSet plot ​47​ shows the frequency of endorsing one or several 
options in the question about temporal reference frames in the BASE-II study. The lower left panel shows 
simple counts, whereas the top panel shows how options were combined. Only the fifteen most common 
combinations are shown here. 
Do people think about risks they took, avoided, or both? 
Among those who mentioned codeable risks, most (53%, n=1,129) respondents clearly 
mentioned risks they took, and only 2% mentioned risks they avoided. For the remainder of 
responses, it was unclear whether risks were taken or avoided (32%), no two coders agreed 
(12%), or respondents wrote about risks that others took (1%). Crime, gambling, and investment 




 BASE-II respondents were asked whether the risks they had taken in the last year had been 
worthwhile. Of those respondents who listed a risk taken in the last year, most reported that it 
was worth taking the risks (68%, n=709) or that the risks were partially worthwhile (11%). A total 
of 3% gave different answers for different risks, and 4% said it was too soon to tell whether it 
had been worth taking the risk. Only 9% said clearly that taking the risk had not been worth it, 
and 1% said they did not know. For 4% of responses no two coders agreed. Compared to the 
average level of regret, respondents appeared to particularly regret risks taken in the domains 
of gambling (26% of cases when gambling was the topic), crime (17%), and traffic (14%), 
whereas few regretted taking risks related to relationships (5%), sports (4%), their career or 
educational decisions (3%), and travel (1%). 
Do age and gender affect the risks people refer to? 
On average, men were more likely to mention risks of injury such as traffic and sports risks. 
Women mentioned relationship and travel risks more often than men. Older people—women 
and men alike—rarely mentioned career and educational decisions or sports, but increasingly 
mentioned traffic, health, and safety risks (Figure 5). Young men were most likely to mention 
gambling; otherwise age trends were largely parallel for men and women. Age and gender 
differences in reference frames were less pronounced than topic differences (see 




Figure 5. ​Age trends and gender differences in​ ​risk domains coded based on what people thought about 
when answering the General Risk Question. The lines show regression splines by gender with shaded 
95% credible intervals. Dashed lines indicate men, solid lines women. The BASE-II and SOEP-IS 
samples were pooled and a contrast-coded dummy for study was adjusted for. 
 
Can independent third parties agree on what people's 
experiences say about their preferences? 
We found that coders could—based solely on the texts—estimate the stated risk preference (on 
a scale from 0 to 10) of the text's author above chance level by using cues such as the number 
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 of risks, whether risks were seen as worthwhile, or whether risks were avoided (see 
Supplementary Table 23). The zero-order correlation between stated preferences and mean 
coder estimates was 0.27 (95% CI [0.23;0.31]) and was well-described by a linear function (see 
Figure 6). Coders agreed not only with the respondents, but also with one another: When 
weighted by the coders' confidence, the intraclass correlation (ICC) was .63 (unweighted ICC 
.43), showing substantial agreement across coders. When coders were more confident, their 
judgments were also more accurate (see Supplementary Figure 22). Coders only minimally 
underestimated respondents' risk preferences on average and less so when coders were 
confident (by 0.14 points, see Supplement 8.2). Coders tended towards the mean, 
overestimating low preferences for risk and underestimating high preferences. This tendency 
was more pronounced when coders were less confident in their judgment. 
 
We carried out a social judgment analysis​48,49​ to determine which cues coders used to infer 
stated risk preferences and how validly these cues could predict respondents' stated 
preferences. Results showed that coders generally used valid cues (i.e., cues such as the 
number of risks which predicted both coder judgments and respondents' stated preferences; 
r​=.74 between predicted judgments and predicted outcomes). However, coders also used some 
invalid cues. For instance, coders rated those who responded vaguely as lower in risk 
preference, even though vagueness was not predictive of stated risk preference (see 
Supplement 8.7). A pastiche, to preserve anonymity, of a text that received the lowest rating 
would be: “I always keep my head out of things, and only take credits with fixed interest rates. In 
the last year, I tried a new restaurant.” A pastiche for someone who received the highest rating 
would be “I thought about races on the motorway, and cheating on my partner. In the last year, I 
travelled abroad without having any money.” 
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Figure 6. ​The green line shows a linear regression fit with the 95% confidence interval shaded. Along the 
dashed line, coder and self-ratings matched. Points were jittered slightly to reduce overplotting. 
 
We also tested whether the coders could infer risk preferences from the texts equally well for 
respondents with different ages and genders to see whether idiosyncrasies in risk perception 
across age groups and gender might decrease the validity of stated preferences. We jointly 
tested several potential modulators of coders' ability to infer risk preferences—study, 
respondent’s age, respondent’s gender, and the coder having the same gender as the 
respondent—to separate their contributions to accuracy while adjusting for the number of 
characters written. This model was necessary due to variations between the two studies; for 
example, BASE-II respondents wrote more characters and were older on average than 
SOEP-IS respondents. In this model, accuracy did not differ depending on the respondents' 
age, gender, or the coder's gender being the same as the respondent's. However, BASE-II 
respondents were rated more accurately (i.e., coders’ evaluations matched respondents’ 
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 self-evaluations) by coders (​r ​= .33 vs. ​r = ​.21 in SOEP-IS; see also Table 2.), fitting the finding 
that considering risks worthwhile (this question was not asked in SOEP-IS) was a valid cue in 
the social judgment analysis. 
 
Table 2.​ Results from a distributional regression. 
Predictor Estimates CI (95%) 
Intercept 4.27 3.66; 4.89 
Stated risk preference  0.15 0.13; 0.18 
σ – Intercept 0.23 -0.07; 0.51 
σ – BASE-II participant -0.08 -0.13; -0.03 
σ – Male gender -0.01 -0.05; 0.03 
σ – Coder has same gender -0.01 -0.06; 0.03 
σ – Age (in decades) 0.00 -0.01; 0.02 
σ – log10 (nr. of characters) 0.05 0.03; 0.08 
sd(Respondent-Intercept) 1.06 1.02; 1.11 
sd(Coder-Intercept) 0.80 0.46; 1.45 
sd(σ - Intercept) 0.42 0.24; 0.76 
Note.​ The model was fit in brms.​50​ We let respondents' stated risk preferences predict the coder ratings of 
risk preference and let several moderators jointly predict the error term (σ) in order to disentangle their 
contributions. BASE-II participants were rated more accurately, when adjusting for the effects of age, 
gender, coder gender, and number of written characters. The model includes 2,293 respondents rated 
6,863 times by nine coders (~3 each). 
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 Discussion 
To investigate how stated preferences can be valid, we asked respondents to explain their 
answers to a general question about their risk preferences.​6​ Our results show that people 
establish a shared reference frame by seeing what preferences are revealed in the risks they 
themselves took, avoided, and regretted. We argue that this self-judgment taps into an ability for 
social judgment​29,31​ that people need to quickly assess whether someone will be a steadfast ally 
or an unpredictable enemy.​32​ With just a brief glimpse into our respondents' self-perceptions, 
our coders were able to infer their stated risk preferences to a significant extent. Coders did 
even better when, as in the BASE-II study, they had access to information about respondents' 
experiences of regret. We argue that self-judgments of risk preferences take into account not 
just actions, but also situational constraints and internal states such as experiences of regret, or 
need.  
 
The risks people thought about were highly heterogeneous, but most respondents focused on 
voluntary behaviours and decisions with risk of easily observable harm, including physical, 
financial, and social risk. Major life decisions, especially risks taken in relationships, 
investments, and careers were often mentioned. Cumulative and delayed risks of harm, such as 
smoking or unprotected sex, were mentioned only infrequently. Passively tolerated sources of 
risk from technology or natural hazards were almost never mentioned. It seems that when 
people consider which actions reveal their risk preferences, they think of more diverse actions 
than the ones experimental economists and psychologists use in the laboratory. Gambling, the 
most common laboratory measure of risk preferences, was mentioned only rarely, and unlike 
more commonly mentioned risks it was avoided and regretted more often. Seen through the 
eyes of our respondents, gambling is an odd risk: The precisely defined risk, the possibility of 
avoiding gambling entirely, and the frequency of regret all make it different from the more 
commonly mentioned risks taken in relationships, investments, health, and careers. In contrast, 
the widely used DOSPERT questionnaire​51​ asks about a list of hypothetical behaviours that may 
better capture the diversity of risks people have in mind, in terms of both risk domains and size 
of stakes. It includes everyday behaviours such as not wearing a seatbelt, more rare behaviours 
like having an affair, and rare but important events like choosing a more enjoyable but less 
secure career. In our data, relationship and career risks were also prominent, especially among 
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 the biggest risks faced in the previous year (see also Supplementary Note 1). These risk 
domains are amongst those highest on the Unknown dimension of the Slovic system: Decisions 
about whether to marry, divorce, move, quit a job, or study a particular subject are highly 
uncertain and can seriously alter a life's trajectory. Respondents realized this and frequently 
mentioned such decisions with very large stakes—which may indeed reveal more about their 
own risk preferences than risks with low stakes as are typical in the laboratory. It is possible that 
preferences were not only revealed through these decisions but also shaped by their 
consequences: As people learn through trial and error, their preferences mature over the 
lifespan.​52 
 
The difficulty of building revealed risk preference tasks in domains like relationships makes 
representative designs, which capture the ecology of risks, less likely in the laboratory.​4,48​ Much 
research operates under the assumption that the extrapolation from small to big risks is 
possible​4,13​—that the person who gambles in a laboratory lottery will also gamble with their life 
and happiness. However, this assumption may not hold. More work needs to be done to 
account for the older evidence showing that people are more risk averse when facing high 
financial stakes,​53​ mounting evidence of the low criterion validity of revealed risk preference 
tasks,​5,54​ and recent work finding that hypothetical lotteries are workable proxies of incentivised 
ones.​55​ Potentially, any shared validity between hypothetical lotteries and stated preferences 
results from the same process: People look to their past actions and experiences to construct a 
response to an abstract decision.​22,24,56​ This process may also explain the validity of the 
DOSPERT questionnaire, in which all behaviours are hypothetical and people predict their own 
behaviour. Still, even the 30–40 items of the DOSPERT questionnaire cannot capture all the 
idiosyncratic, yet pertinent risks our respondents listed (e.g., “buying a horse and never telling 
your partner”), but people could draw on idiosyncratic experiences to reasonably predict their 
own behaviour in standardised hypothetical situations. Perhaps the DOSPERT questionnaire 
additionally works as an aid for dialectical bootstrapping,​57​ helping people to come up with 
several responses that reflect their true preference plus noise, which can then be averaged for 
increased reliability (see also Supplementary Note 2). 
 
Because our coders could, to a significant extent, infer respondents' risk preferences from the 
texts, we know the texts contained valid cues, such as the number of risks and whether risks 
were avoided or regretted. In fact, the correspondence between coder ratings and stated 
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 preferences in our study (r = .27) was similar to the correspondence between risk perceptions in 
self-ratings and ratings by close informants (​r​s = .25-.46​58​) and to the correspondence for 
decisions between lotteries (​r ​= .31) between two household members.​59​ It was also close to the 
agreement between self and other ratings among Facebook friends for personality traits.​60 
Despite being very brief—a median of 10 words—the texts contained condensed, pertinent 
information. Our social judgment analysis showed that coders relied on cues such as regret, the 
number of risks listed for the last 12 months, and risk avoidance. They also took note of specific 
risky activities, such as motorcycling and sports, and correctly inferred that respondents who 
listed investments as a risky activity had stated lower risk preferences.  
 
The topics respondents thought about differed by age and gender. For example, an elderly 
respondent listed “getting into the bathtub” as a risk, which might not strike younger 
respondents as particularly threatening. More generally, older respondents were more likely to 
mention risks in health and traffic, and less likely to focus on their career or gambling. Gender 
and age differences in risk perception and conception (i.e., focusing on favourable or 
unfavourable outcomes​61​) might provoke doubt that there is a common denominator that allows 
for comparing stated risk preferences across age groups and genders. We think it is actually the 
other way around: Risk perception and conception are cues to people's risk preference too.​61,62 
In initial support of this notion, our coders—aged between 23 and 36—were equally accurate 
when inferring the preference of older respondents or those of the opposite gender. Given that 
people can agree on perceptions of risk,​45,62​ as we found in our online sample, they can also 
agree on what taking specific risks implies for somebody's risk preferences. This interpretation 
leads to a more optimistic conclusion than the widespread idea that people always anchor 
themselves to a social reference group (which would change according to age, location, and 
time). Indeed, only a minority of our respondents said they used social comparison; most said 
they simply thought about their experiences and behaviours. This result may explain why, in 
apparent conflict with a cognitive model of personality judgments,​63​ specifying reference groups 
reduced predictive validity in a study of conscientiousness.​41​ If most people do not naturally tend 
to compare themselves to a reference group, they may do worse when required to do so. Much 
of the literature has focused on finding out whether questions could be improved, by specifying 
their frame of reference,​41,42​ reference groups,​63,64​ examples,​40​ or specific behaviours,​65,66​ or by 
generally reducing temporary, fluctuating influences.​27,28​ In risk preference research, Blais and 
Weber​51​ attempted to remove any part played by differences in risk perception. 
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 Counterintuitively, leaving self-report questions fairly broad and vague may sometimes improve 
validity, as long as people understand the question and can draw on relevant experiences. A 
comprehensive single item may allow people to use their ability of social perception to draw on 
their most pertinent and diagnostic information, thereby outweighing improvements from further 
constraints on the question that would make answering it less like social perception. 
 
We conclude that what many researchers feel is a weakness of stated preferences might 
actually be a strength.​15​ The fairly vague, almost projective nature of a comprehensive single 
item allows people to refer back to their diagnostic memories and behaviours using a 
well-honed human capacity for social perception. People with different risk perceptions and 
conceptions could be problematic for the intersubjective comparability of their answers,​61​ but we 
find that people (our coders) can agree on what risky behaviours imply for someone's risk 
preference, irrespective of age and gender. The shared social perception of risks fosters 
agreement, comparability, and validity of risk preferences too. This does not mean that 
self-reports can be trusted to screen for risk-seekers when trying to recruit responsible financial 
managers. People could still lie—just as they could in typical laboratory tasks, where stakes are 
generally low. 
 
Far from “cheap talk,” self- and informant-reports are based on informative and diagnostic cues 
and permit people to apply the full might of social perception to themselves. These results 
suggest that researchers in economics and psychology can learn from the experts on person 
perception: their study participants. By inferring their risk preferences from their diagnostic 
behaviours and experiences, people essentially adopt the logic of the revealed preference 
approach—namely, that otherwise unobservable preferences reveal themselves in behaviour. 
Ironically, economics’ revealed preference approach, which has recently encountered many 
difficulties in the experimental literature studying behavioural risk measures, appears to have 
found new significance in research on stated risk preference—the method that the revealed 
preference approach has deemed of dubious value.  
Materials and Methods 
All questions and materials needed to reproduce the study have been shared on Open Science 
Framework (OSF) at ​osf.io/eun4r/​. The main questions can be found in Supplementary Note 3. 
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 The stated preferences were collected in the 2017 interim wave of the Berlin Aging Study II 
(BASE-II​43​) and the 2017/2018 wave of the SOEP innovation sample (SOEP-IS​44​). Both studies 
are age-heterogeneous longitudinal panel studies. SOEP-IS aims to representatively sample 
private households in Germany, whereas BASE-II is a convenience sample of younger and 
older adults from Berlin, Germany. Participants in both studies had already answered the 
general and domain-specific risk questions in previous waves. In the 2017/2018 wave, 3,493 
respondents answered the GRQ and 3,089 answered several questions that elicited free-text 
source reports. Both studies have been documented on ​https://paneldata.org​. Fieldwork for 
SOEP-IS started in September 2017 and ended in February 2018. Questionnaires for BASE-II 
were mailed out at the beginning of November 2017; data collection ended in January 2018. 
The online rater sample was recruited from the psytests.de and the psyweb.uni-muenster.de 
online panels from April to August 2018. Participants could win one of 50 Amazon coupons 
worth €25 each in a lottery. The coders were recruited from the participant pool of the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development and were paid €180 each. Descriptive statistics for all 
samples are summarised in Table 3. The anonymised data for the online rating study is 
available on OSF. The SOEP-IS data can be obtained from the SOEP re-analysis archive; the 
BASE-II data can be obtained from the BASE-II Steering Committee.  
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 Mean (SD) Missing Mean (SD) Missing Mean (SD) Missing Mean (SD) 
Age 53.4 (18.6) 0 66.6 (15.9) 0 46.8 (17.6) 272 27.9 (4.4) 
Male 47% 0 48% 0 39% 281 56% 
Gen. Risk 
Q. 
4.6 (2.4) 0 5.2 (2.3) 4 4.4 (2.1) 123  
No. of 
words 
7.5 (8.0) 274 18.0 (15.5) 138    
Text 
length 
51 (51) 274 135 (106) 134    
Codeable 
topics Q1 
46% 0 80% 0    
Codeable 
topics Q2 
40% 0 67% 0    
 
Note. ​SD=Standard deviation. There were no missing values for the coders. A subsample of n=825 online 
raters rated the risks (n=119 ended the study before the ratings). 
Measures 
Stated preferences 
Stated preferences were measured using the General Risk Question (GRQ​6​). After the 
respondents answered this question, they were asked a series of follow-up questions. We 
slightly reduced the number of questions for SOEP-IS compared to BASE-II to fit the time 
requirements of the panel. In both studies, the first follow-up question was “Which events, 
behaviour, or persons did you think about when you indicated a number for your risk 
preference?” Participants could check multiple options: “own experiences,” “own behaviour,” 
“my behaviour compared to others,” “the consequences of my behaviour for me,” “the 
consequences of my behaviour for others,” and “thought about what people around me say 
about my risk preference.” In SOEP-IS, respondents could additionally choose from several 
nonresponse options: “gave my answer spontaneously without deliberating a great deal,” “none 
of these,” and “no answer.” In BASE-II, a second multiple choice question asked respondents 
whether they thought about one or more of the following options: “how I presently behave in my 
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 day-to-day life,” “how I behaved in the past,” “how I will behave in the future,” “how prepared for 
risks I would like to be,” and “did not think about myself.” In both studies, the closed-form 
questions were followed by free-text questions. They were “Which concrete experiences or 
behaviours—it does not matter if yours or others'—did you think about? Please give keywords” 
and “In which situations in the last 12 months were you prepared to take risks? List up to three 
situations in which you took the biggest risks. Keywords suffice.” In BASE-II only, respondents 
were then asked, “And were the risks worth it?”  
 
The BASE-II respondents filled out paper-and-pencil questionnaires and returned them by mail. 
They were given four lines to write on for each free-text question. Their responses were later 
transcribed by student assistants at the Humboldt University Berlin. In SOEP-IS, respondents 
answered verbally and the interviewer transcribed their answers during computer-assisted 
personal interviewing. BASE-II respondents gave valid and elaborate answers to the free-text 
questions more frequently than did the SOEP-IS participants: 92%, compared to 86% 
(​n​s=1,435; 1,654) answered at least one of two free-text questions. BASE-II respondents wrote 
a median number of 106 characters; the median for SOEP-IS respondents was 35 characters. 
Texts by BASE-II respondents were sufficiently informative to code risk topics for 1,248 
responses to the question asking them to explain their thinking for the stated preferences, and 
for 1,056 responses to the question asking about risks taken in the last year. Given the shorter 
responses in SOEP-IS, topics were codeable only for ​n​s=890/773 free-text responses (see also 
Supplementary Section 4). 
Text coding 
The texts written by the BASE-II and SOEP-IS participants were hand-coded by a set of nine 
coders (aged 23–36, four women) over multiple days. We randomly divided the full-text answers 
into two sets of 1,000 and one set of 1,059 answers. The coding scheme was derived through a 
mixture of a deductive approach (risk factors listed in the literature​45​) and an inductive approach 
(further risk factors mentioned in the texts). For initial training, all coders coded a set of the 
same 50 texts. Afterwards, the coding scheme was refined and agreement was checked 
according to Fleiss’ Kappa. Points of disagreement about the scheme between coders were 
resolved by the first author (RCA). For the remainder of the texts, three coders coded each text. 
Coders tended to agree on the presence of risk domains; Fleiss' Kappas were above .70 for all 
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 coder groups (see Supplementary Table 20) and all risks except safety and crime (κ ≥ .49, 
because coders could not always agree whether respondents were perpetrators or victims of 
crime), and cataclysms (κ = .00–.61, but this category was very rare). They also noted whether 
the texts mentioned risks that were taken or avoided (here, agreement was only slight: κ = 
.04–.18) as well as whether respondents thought the risk had been worthwhile (κ = 0.71–0.77).  
 
Coders saw all the answers to the free-text questions given by a respondent simultaneously in 
case the answers referenced each other. They did not see the answers to the closed-form 
questions or other identifying characteristics. First, coders judged whether meaningful topics or 
situations were mentioned in the response. If not, they could code whether the response was 
gibberish, a statement of absence, or similar. The coders then coded the presence of the topics 
from the coding scheme such as health and relationships for each of the two free-text​ ​questions. 
Some topics included subcategories (e.g., operations or divorce) that could be coded (see 
Supplementary Tables 25-26). For the first question, which asked respondents to explain their 
thinking for their stated preferences, coders noted whether the situations and events described 
had a risk prevention or promotion focus (the second question was explicitly about risks taken in 
the last year and therefore could not be codified according to risk prevention or promotion). For 
the question asking whether risks were worthwhile, which appeared only in BASE-II, coders 
noted whether the respondents thought the risk had been worthwhile or whether they were 
unable to tell so far (e.g., long-term financial risks). Finally, the coders rated the respondent on 
the same GRQ that the respondent had answered. For our analyses, we chose the consensus 
value given by the coders (i.e., the coding made by at least two coders) or the mean for 
continuous values. For the 50 texts that we used to train coders, we omitted the data from the 
first six coders before aggregation to keep the procedure comparable for all texts.  
Analyses 
Our data processing code, statistical analyses, and detailed results are reproducibly 
documented on OSF (​osf.io/eun4r/​).  
Online rating of risk perceptions 
Online participants rated the risk factors or behaviours from our coding scheme (e.g., moving in 
together and smoking) on 22 dimensions (e.g., observability and reducibility). To find out how 
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 reliable the average ratings were, we computed average ICCs for each dimension for an 
average of 17 aggregated ratings, which was the lowest number of ratings any risk topic had 
received (median = 37). Average ICCs ranged from .73 (whether risks were known to science) 
to .97 (whether these were risks for social position). These ICCs are lower bounds, as most 
risks were rated by more than 17 raters. Because it is not possible to meaningfully answer 
questions such as “Are health risks known to science?” the online sample did not rate broad and 
vague risk domains such as health and traffic; instead, we averaged the ratings of the 
constituent subtopics to arrive at values for the risk domains. To lay out the risk factors on a 
familiar map for our readers, we extracted the factors Dread and Unknown according to a 
confirmatory specification based on 16 dimensions from Slovic​45​. We could approximately 
replicate the coordinate system positions of risks in Slovic​45​, fulfilling our limited aim, 
but—probably because we had added non-mortality, social risks—fit indices fell short (see 
Supplement 7). Owing to a programming error, the topics “gambling”, "travel", and "surgery" 
were not rated by the online sample and are therefore missing in Figure 2. 
Coder-estimated risk preferences 
Coders had indicated whether the text contained direct hints to the authors’ gender, age, or 
place of residence, such as, “My husband lost at bingo in our retirement home in Munich.” 
Because such hints might serve as cues to the stated risk preference, given age and sex 
differences in risk preferences, but would be unrelated to risk conceptions per se, we restricted 
the main analysis to the majority (97%, n = 2,310) of texts which contained no direct hints. Even 
indirect hints, such as considering “getting into the bathtub” a risk, seemed to play little role: 
accuracy was not attenuated when we adjusted for respondent age and gender (see 
Supplement 8.1). 
 
Coders could tell when they had usable information. Accuracy was r = .06 when coders said 
they were guessing, but r = .45 when they had maximal confidence (see Supplement 8.5). 
Coders did not learn to judge more accurately with practice, which we expected given that they 
received no feedback. 
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